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TAX BENEFITS FOR WIDOWS, THE SUPREME COURT'S
ATTITUDE TOWARD REMEDIAL SEX
LEGISLATION-KAHN v. SHEVIN
Significant progress has been made in the past few years in the battle
to subdue all forms of discrimination based on sexual classifications.' The
opponents of such discrimination have been moving both on the legislative
front to pass the Equal Rights Amendment2 and on the judicial front to get
sex declared a suspect classification, subjecting any sex-based legislation
to the strict scrutiny, compelling state interest test.8 However, the United
1. This is particularly true on the federal level. In the area of legislation see
CIVIL RIGHTS AcT of 1970, TITLE VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1970), as
amended, EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNmTIES AcT of 1972; EQUAL PAY AcT of
1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1970). Congress has also amended many United States
Code provisions which formerly contained distinctions based on sex. See, e.g., 5
U.S.C. § 2108(3) (1970), as amended, (Supp. I, 1971) (making widowers and hus-
bands eligible for veterans preference in the federal civil service under the same con-
ditions as widows and wives), 5 U.S.C. § 5924 (1970), as amended, (Supp. I, 1971)
(cost of living allowance to dependents of federal employees living in a foreign area
formerly payable to "wife or his dependents" now payable to "employee's spouse or
dependents"), 5 U.S.C. § 8341 (1970), as amended, (Supp. II, 1972) (granting wid-
owers same automatic qualification as widows for federal civil service survivor's an-
nuities); 38 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1970), as amended, (Supp. H, 1972) (redefines de-
pendent to automatically include husbands of veterans for educational assistance pur-
poses); 42 U.S.C. § 414(a)(1) (1970), as amended, (Supp. II, 1972) (more favor-
able method of computing social security benefits upon retirement extended to men);
37 U.S.C.A. § 401 (1970), as amended, (Supp. 1974) (authorizing automatic veteran
benefits for husbands or widowers, already enjoyed by wives and widows, regardless
of dependency).
On the executive level see ExEc. ORDER No. 11,246, 3 C.F.R. 169 (1974), 42
U.S.C. § 2000e (1970) (nondiscrimination by government contractors); ExEc. ORDER
No. 11,478, as amended, 3 C.F.R. 207 (1974), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970) (equal em-
ployment opportunity in the federal government); 29 C.F.R. § 800 et seq. (1974)
(Dept. of Labor interpretations of the EQUAL PAY AcT).
2. At the time of this writing thirty-four states have passed the Equal Rights
Amendment. Proposed Amendment to the United States Constitution, H.R.J. Res.
208, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); S.J. Res. 8, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. (1971). Four more
states must ratify it before the 1979 deadline.
3. Under this higher standard of review the Court examines the articulated leg-
islative purpose served and only upon a determination that such purpose is of over-
whelming public interest and significance will the statute in question be upheld.
Strict scrutiny is called into effect whenever a statute infringes upon certain "funda-
mental" rights, or is based on "suspect" classifications. For a compilation of cases
involving fundamental rights and suspect classifications see Note, No Dogs, Cats, or
797
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
States Supreme Court has stalled progress along the latter line of attack,
at least temporarily, with its recent decision in Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S.
351 (1974) by upholding a Florida statute that grants a $500 property
tax exemption to widows while refusing the same exemption to widowers.
In 1971 Mel Kahn, a widower living in Florida, applied for a $500
property tax exemption which was made available to widows under
Florida Statute § 196.191(7). 4 He was denied the tax exemption by the
assessor's office and sought relief in the Circuit Court for Dade County,
Florida. The Circuit Court held that the statute, as it applies to women
only, was discriminatory and therefore was unconstitutional under the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States
Constitution.5 However, the Supreme Court of Florida reversed, holding
the statute to be a valid legislative enactment. 6 On appeal the United
States Supreme Court, Justice Douglas writing for the majority, held that
;the law was valid as being "reasonably designed .to further the state policy
of cushioning the financial impact of spousal loss upon the sex for whom
,that loss imposes a disproportionately heavy burden."'7
In his opinion, Justice Douglas emphasized the realities of female em-
ployment in the United States.8 The job market is, at best, "inhospitable
to the woman seeking any but the lowest paid job."9  Indeed, even when
a woman obtains a job, she usually earns considerably less than her male
counterpart, despite federal legislation to the contrary. 10 Justice Douglas
argued further that
[t]he disparity is likely to be exacerbated for the widow. While the
widower can usually continue in the occupation which preceded his spouse's
Voluntary Families Allowed-Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 24 DEPAuL L. REv.
784, 792-93 nn. 47-48 (1975).
4. FLA. STAT. § 196.191(7) (1971), as amended, FLA. STAT. § 196.202 (1973)
provides:
Property to the value of five hundred dollars ($500) of every widow, blind
person, or totally and permanently disabled person who is a bona fide resi-
dent of this state shall be exempt from taxation.
Id.
5. See Note, 88 HARV. L. REv. 129 n.5 (1974) citing Kahn v. Straughn, No.
71-20673 (Dade County Cir. Ct., Apr. 21, 1972), reprinted in Jurisdictional State-
ment for Appellant at Al.
6. Shevin v. Kahn, 273 So. 2d 72 (Fla. 1973). The Florida Supreme Court
felt that since women workers earn less than men, this statute was rationally related
"to the ability of women property owners to pay taxes on property of even minimal
value." Id. at 73.
7. 416U.S. at 355.
8. See notes 34-36 and accompanying text infra.
9. 416 U.S. at 353.
10. Id. & n.4.
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death in many cases the widow will find herself suddenly forced into a job
market with which she is unfamiliar, and in which, because of her former
economic dependency, she will have fewer skills to offer."1
Finally, in the last paragraph of his opinion, Justice Douglas emphasized
that taxation is traditionally an area in which the Supreme Court gives
great leeway to the states in structuring their own programs.' 2 In reality,
however, the taxation argument appears to have been included almost as
an afterthought. 13 Justice Douglas' opinion leaves the distinct impression
that the fact that a tax program is involved in Kahn is valuable only to
the extent it renders a decision made on other grounds easier to justify.
The traditional deference shown to state tax programs is invoked to, first,
help bolster the validity of this statute in the eyes of those not already
totally convinced by the statistical analysis of female employment and
wages in the United States, 14 and second, to justify the Court's lack of
analysis as to those statistics and as to the possible adverse effects of this
statute.15
The major issue raised by Kahn is what standard of review is to be ap-
plied to future claims of sex discrimination under the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment.' Where, if at all, does Kahn fit
11. Id. at 354.
12. See Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356 (1973); Allied
Stores of Ohio v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522 (1959); Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83
(1940); Lawrence v. State Tax Comm'n, 286 U.S. 276 (1932); Ohio Oil Co. v. Con-
way, 281 U.S. 146 (1930); F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412 (1920);
Bell's Gap R.R. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U.S. 232 (1890).
13. Although taxation is traditionally given a wide berth by the Court, it cannot
justify what would otherwise be unconstitutional. See Note, 88 HARv. L. REv. 129,
133-134 n.34 (1974) citing Falkenstein v. Dep't of Revenue, 350 F. Supp. 887 (D.
Ore. 1972), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1099 (1973) (state tax exemption for dis-
criminatory organization violates equal protection clause).
Neither can statutory classifications be justified on the basis that the tax is a privi-
lege, as opposed to a right. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627 n.6 (1969).
14. Kahn apparently leaves us with a program that is constitutional only so long
as the statistics concerning female employment remain constant. If in five or ten
years female employment and wages were to be equal to or greater than that of
males, then this statute would appear to be unconstitutional. The only available jus-
tification at that point would be that tax programs are given great leeway by the
Court. Even on this basis, however, the affirmance of such a program would still
be doubtful. The appellants raised a similar argument by noting that "[i]f appellee's
,[taxation] rationale is accepted, then Florida could, with at least equally 'compelling'
justification, dispense tax exemption solely on the basis of race or national origin."
Reply Brief for Appellant at 3. Thus, unlike affirmative action programs which at-
tack the source of a problem and then are phased out of operation, the statute in-
volved in Kahn faces the interesting prospect of becoming increasingly unconstitu-
tional as the years pass.
15. See notes 51 through 55 and accompanying text infra.
16. This issue is enveloped in the much larger question of the fate of the equal
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under the two-tier equal protection analysis traditionally invoked by the
Court, and how does it change those standards?
Most obviously Kahn removes sex from any imminent "danger" of being
declared a suspect classification and therefore being subjected to a strict
scrutiny analysis, if indeed it was ever in such "danger."'1 7  Traditionally,
the failure to invoke strict scrutiny would then relegate sex discrimination
to review under minimal rationality-the less stringent level of the two-
tier equal protection analysis traditionally employed by the Court.18
However, the past few years have seen the Court produce decisions which
depart from this strict two-tier equal protection analysis. 19 In Reed v.
Reed20 and Frontiero v. Richardson2l the Court seemed willing to subject
claims of sex discrimination to some type of vague, undefined "middle-
tier" analysis. 22 The Court, however, has been exceedingly reluctant to
protection clause in general under the Burger Court. For a fuller treatment of this
question see G. GUNTHER & N. DowLuNo, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW, SECTION 5 (8th ed. Supp. 1974) (hereinafter cited as GUNTHER & DOWLING];
Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, Forward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine
on a Changing Court: A Model for Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1
(1972) [hereinafter cited as Gunther]. See also Note, Cost and Judicial Manage-
ment Considerations in the Right to Counsel for Indigents' Discretionary Appeals-
Ross v. Moffitt, 24 DEPAUL L. REV. 813 (1975); Note, No Dogs, Cats, or Voluntary
Families Allowed-Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 24 DEPAUL L. REv. 784 (1975).
17. In Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) four justices, in a plurality
opinion written by Justice Brennan, declared themselves willing to accept sex as a
suspect classification. Of those four justices, three dissented in Kahn (Justices Bren-
nan, Marshall, and White). These justices retained their view that sex was indeed
a suspect classification, though Justices Brennan and Marshall might have affirmed if
the statute had been more narrowly tailored to meet its objectives. See 416 U.S.
at 358 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
18. Minimal rationality essentially refers to the deferential old equal protection
standard under which a statute that appeared to further some conceivably legitimate
state interest would be upheld. See Note, No Dogs, Cats, or Voluntary Families Al-
lowed-Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 24 DEPAuL L. REV. 784, 792 n.45 (1975).
19. Such "deviations" are by no means limited to sex discrimination cases. See
id. at n.18 (1975).
20. 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (invalidating provision of Idaho probate code which gave
preference to men over women when persons of same priority class apply for appoint-
ment as administrator of an estate).
21. 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (invalidating provision of UNITED STATES CODE allow-
ing servicemen to automatically claim spouse as dependent while requiring service-
women to prove the dependency of their spouses).
22. Note, 87 HAxv. L. REV. 116, 121 (1973). But see Forbush v. Wallace, 341
F. Supp. 217 (M.D. Ala. 1971), aff'd mem., 405 U.S. 970 (1972) (upholding the re-
quirement that a wife upon marriage take her husband's surname and that she use
that name in order to obtain a driver's license), and Williams v. McNair, 316 F.
Supp. 134 (D.S.C. 1970), aff'd mem., 401 U.S. 951 (1971) (upholding the operation
of a state school for girls only),
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announce the ingredients involved in this new standard 23 and, indeed, has
denied creating a new standard at all. 24 Even though its decisions appear
to reflect a "mounting discontent with the rigid two-tier formulations of
the Warren Court's equal protection doctrine," 25 the unwillingness of the
Court to clearly pronounce its true standards of review is continued in
Kahn.
Despite the refusal of the Court to declare sex a suspect classification,
Kahn should not be read as returning sex-based classifications to the mini-
mal rationality-old equal protection standard of review. 26 Yet, as a result
.of the aforementioned reluctance of the Court to enunciate its standard
of review, establishing a workable "middle-tier" analysis is perhaps an
Although Forbush and Williams appear to apply minimal scrutiny to sex classifica-
tions, both can be reconciled with the hypothesis that a middle-tier standard of review
exists. In each case the court emphasized the options open to appellants. In For-
bush, a woman could easily apply to probate court to have her name legally changed,
while in Williams, there were seven other state schools which admitted men, and ap-
pellants could show no difference between the programs offered at these schools and
the programs offered at the school to which they sought entrance. Actually Forbush
and Williams appear to uphold the "sliding scale" approach described in note 24 in-
fra, whereby the Court weighs the interests of the state against the interests of the
individual infringed upon. Thus, although upholding classifications based on sex,
these cases also lend credence to the view that something other than a strict two-
tier analysis is being used by the Court in equal protection cases.
23. Such reluctance has resulted in the confusion of lower courts as to which
standard to apply. See Nowak, Realigning the Standards of Review Under the Equal
Protection Guarantee-Prohibited, Neutral, and Permissive Classifications, 62 GEo.
L. J. 1071, 1092 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Nowak]. For a clear example of such
lower court confusion see Wiesenfeld v. Secretary of HEW, 367 F. Supp. 981 (D.N.J.
1973), afI'd sub nom. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 95 S. Ct. 1225 (1975).
Likewise, such vagueness has produced increased speculation by commentators try-
ing to outline models to fit the Court's recent decisions. See Gunther, supra note
16; Getman, The Emerging Constitutional Principle of Sexual Equality, 1972 SuP.
CT. REv. 157; Note, 87 HARv. L. REV. 116 (1973); Comment, "Newer" Equal Protec-
tion: The Impact of the Means-Focused Model, 23 BuFF. L. REV. 665 (1974);
Nowak, supra. At least one authority has even suggested that the Court, in reaching
for alternatives to equal protection analysis, has resurrected substantive due process.
See Tribe, The Supreme Court, 1972 Term, Forward: Toward a Model of Roles in
the Due Process of Life and Law, 87 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
Tribe].
24. Only Justice Marshall has been willing to openly pronounce a break with the
strict two-tier approach. In San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1,
98 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting), and Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 521
(1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting), Justice Marshall describes the "sliding scale" ap-
proach which he has advocated in other equal protection cases. The main ingredients
of such an approach are that the Court analyzes and balances the classifications used,
the individual interests infringed upon, and the governmental interests upheld by such
infringement.
25. Gunther, supra note 16, at 12.
26. See Note, 88 HAv. L. REv. 129, 135 (1974).
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even more unenviable task now than it has proven to be in the past. After
the Reed decision it was suggested that the Court was using a "means"
test to suddenly put "consistent new bite into the old equal protection. '27
The model requires that there be an affirmative relation between means and
ends--or, in more traditional equal protection terms, that there be a genuine
difference in terms of the state's objective between the group within the
classification and those without.2 8
This proposed test was further modified after the Frontiero decision, when
it was suggested that a "strict rationality" test was being employed by the
Court.29 The modification lies in the Court's requirement of actual, affir-
mative proof that the challenged legislation meet its proposed objectives.80
If the goals of the legislation are being met by the statute in question then
that statute would be valid. If these tests were, in reality, the standards
of review involved in the Reed and Frontiero decisions, the Court was able
to determine that the Florida statute in question in Kahn satisfied those
standards; that it bore " 'a fair and substantial relation to the object of
the legislation.' ",31 Does such a finding have any effect on the middle-
tier standard proposed after the Court's decisions in Reed and Frontiero?
Does it alter the new "means-focused" model, or does it merely echo it?
As indicated, it was a statistical analysis which convinced the Court that
the statute in question was indeed meeting its articulated purpose. 82
Despite the fact that the number of married women working full-time is
27. Gunther, supra note 16, at 21.
28. Id. at 47.
29. Note, 87 HARV. L. REv. 116, 124 (1973). This strict rationality test hypothe-
sizes that as long as there is actual proof to show that the legislative goal is furthered,
the statute will be upheld.
30. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) might have been decided dif-
ferently if the government had been able to show significant economic savings in ad-
dition to administrative convenience. Id. at 689; Brief for Appellees at 25.
Although evidence was adduced in Frontiero, it was inconclusive as to
whether the ostensible goal of economy was served. The Government of-
fered no evidence to support the contention that it was uneconomical to re-
quire servicemen to produce proof of their wives' dependency, and instead
relied on the stereotype that a man is almost always the breadwinner in his
family.
Note, 87 HARv. L. REv. at 122.
31. 416 U.S. at 352 quoting Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971).
32. As to the importance of the seemingly insignificant point that the statute
meet the articulated state purpose see GuNTHER & DOWLINO, supra note 16, at 221.
The idea that the Court will not supply a statutory objective but will merely examine
those articulated by the state itself is an improvement over old equal protection mini-
mal rationality.
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greater than ever before,3 3 of greater significance for the Court were facts
such as the following:
(1) In 1970, 40% of the males in the work force earned over $10,-
000, and 70% over $7,000, while 45% of the females working
full-time earned less than $5,000, and 73.9% earned less than
$7,000;34
(2) In 1955 women's median earnings were 63.9% of men's median
earnings, while in 1972 the same percentage ratio was only
57.9% ;35
(3) In 1972 the median income of women with four years of college
was $8,736---exactly $100 higher than the median income of
men with less than one year of high school, thus indicating that
the disparities extend to women employed in jobs that are usually
thought of as being well paid. 36
Unfortunately, the Court's acceptance of these statistics is unquestion-
ing, when perhaps it should not have been so. Indeed it could be the
long-awaited advances made by women in gaining entrance to the labor
market that are partially responsible for such disparate statistics. If the
number of working women had remained relatively constant, then the
median income of women would most likely be higher, since there would
be fewer "starting scale" wages to balance against the wages earned by
more experienced women. However, since the number of women enter-
ing the labor force has increased markedly, there obviously are more
"starting scale" wages being earned, which in turn decreases any median
income figure. Thus the Court's figures may not be as discouraging as
would appear at first glance,3 7 for they may well bear somewhat of an
inverse relationship to the progress of women in the labor market. As
increased numbers of working women gain skill and experience, an in-
crease in their wages can be expected. In turn the percentage ratio be-
tween men's and women's median earnings may be expected to shift more
towards an equilibrium.
33. See Brief for Appellants at 6-7 citing Bureau of Labor Statistics U.S. Dep't
of Labor, Employment and Earnings, 34-35 (May, 1971). By 1973 over 33 million
women were in the labor force and 58.5% of these were married.
34. 416 U.S. at 353 & n.4, citing United States Bureau of the Census: Current
Population Reports, Series P-60, No. 80.
35. Id. at 353-54 & n.5, citing Table prepared by Women's Bureau Employment
Standards Administration, United States Dep't of Labor, from data published by
Bureau of Census, U.S. Dep't of Commerce.
36. Id. at 354 & n.6, citing Tables prepared by Women's Bureau, Employment
Standards Administration, United States Dep't of Labor.
37. See Note, 88 HARV. L. REV. 129, 132 & n.29 (1974).
1975]
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Perhaps more importantly, the Court fails to analyze the relative eco-
nomic strengths of widowers, who may continue working or receive their
retirement benefits, and widows, who may receive their husbands' benefits,
insurance money, and perhaps work themselves. It may be that, rela-
tively speaking, widows are better off than widowers. 8s Such conclusions,
though not necessarily true, are illustrative of the type of analysis in which
the Court chose not to engage.8 9 Realistically, of course, there can be
no denial of the fact that women are discriminated against in the job mar-
ket, and such a position is not advocated or argued here. Yet until fac-
tors such as work experience and length of employment are accounted for,
the statistics are indeed misleading and the need for legislation such as
that involved in Kahn can be legitimately questioned. 40
Having eschewed any in depth analysis of the statistics, the Court
deemed that since the strict scrutiny standard of review was not being
used, the "best means" test 41 was inapplicable. 42 The state can attack the
problem of women's limited economic capabilities in essentially any man-
ner it sees fit. It need not deal with the entire problem at once, but can
limit itself to dealing with that aspect of the problem that concerns widows
only. Such a doctrine is not new. 48 It adds nothing new to the Court's
38. Id.
39. Perhaps the Court feared that such an examination would be tantamount to
the application of strict scrutiny. However, to guard against being misled by statis-
tics is far different from requiring a compelling state interest. Any legitimate inter-
est should be based on at least some real evidence.
40. As indicated, text accompanying note 36 supra, wage disparities extend to
women in "high paying" jobs. Yet even these disparities are in part explained by
the experience and length of employment factors. Perhaps more indicative of the
true situation in these fields is a comparison of starting salaries.
The jobs and salaries expected to be offered . . . [to] college graduates
[in 1971] were reported in a survey conducted in November 1970. Salaries
to be offered to women were consistently below those to be offered to men
with the same college major. A comparison with 1970, however, shows a
marked reduction in the spread between salaries for women and men. For
1970 the monthly gap ranged from $86 down to $18; for 1971 the gap
ranged from $68 down to only $1.
Fact Sheet on Earnings Gap, Women's Bureau, Employment Standards Administra-
tion, United States Dep't of Labor (1972).
41. This test is an integral part of the strict scrutiny tier of analysis. Such. a
standard requires the legislature's choice of means to be tailored as precisely as pos-
sible to meet the proposed ends. Obviously the statute involved in Kahn would not
meet this test since it indiscriminately included wealthy widows and excluded deserv-
ing females who were not widows. See 416 U.S. at 360 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
42. See id. at 356 & n.10, where Justice Douglas emphasizes this inapplicability
in response to the dissents.
43. See, e.g., Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 495 (1974); Dandridge v. Wil-
liams, 397 U.S. 471, 486-87 (1970); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483,
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standards of review, and indeed there seems to be little difference between
the proposed Reed and Frontiero means-tests and the unnamed test used
to decide Kahn. For although the Court did not strictly compare the eco-
nomic needs of widowers vis-a-vis widows it could safely conclude that the
legislatively chosen means did meet the chosen ends of easing the economic
burden on widows. Thus the Reed and Frontiero tests would be satisfied.
However, there is an added ingredient in the Court's view of Kahn
which does indeed affect the proposed Reed and Frontiero tests. In addi-
tion to finding that the means fit the proposed end, it is obvious that the
Court also approved the admirable end of this statute. Thus it appears
that the Court is using a "demonstrable basis" standard of review44 under
which it examines not only the means by which a statute accomplishes its
goal, but it also examines the goal itself.45 It is the proposed "remedial"
purpose46 of this legislation that leads to its easy affirmance. 47 Therefore,
the focal area for analysis is the degree to which a remedial or benign
purpose will allow, or aid in, the affirmance of a challenged statute.48
489 (1955); Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 81 (1911). See
also Note, No Dogs, Cats, or Voluntary Families Allowed-Village of Belle Terre
v. Boraas, 24 DEPAUL L. REv. 784, 792 n.45 (1975).
44. Nowak, supra note 23. Under Prof. Nowak's proposed standard the minimal
scrutiny and strict scrutiny standards of review of the old two-tier approach would
still exist, but a third tier would be added. This middle-tier analysis, which examines
means and ends, would be used to analyze those classifications, like sex, based upon
the personal characteristics or status of a group (other than racial heritage). Prof.
Nowak refers to such classification as "neutral classifications" and it is only these that
would call the "demonstrable basis" standard of review into effect.
45. Such a view of the Court's actions might also lend credence to the suggestion
that substantive due process has returned. See Tribe, supra note 23.
46. It is interesting to compare the Court's acceptance of this Florida statute with
its rejection of those involved in Reed and Frontiero. Certainly the underlying as-
sumption that men generally earn more money than women is no more valid than
the assumption in Reed that men in general are more familiar with business matters,
or the assumption in Frontiero that husbands of servicewomen are not generally de-
pendent on their wives, while wives of servicemen are generally dependent on
their husbands. However, the Court reduced the latter two assumptions to mere pre-
texts being used to justify statutes advancing only administrative efficiency, while re-
fusing to do the same in Kahn. The only difference appears to be the supposedly
remedial purpose and effect of the statute involved in Kahn. See 416 U.S. at 361
(White, J., dissenting) where the claim is made that administrative efficiency is the
true purpose of this statute.
47. Such a result was foreshadowed by Justice Brennan in his Frontiero opinion.
It should be noted that these statutes are not in any sense designed to rectify
the effects of past discrimination against women . . . . On the contrary,
these statutes seize upon a group-women-who have historically suffered
discrimination in employment, and rely on the effects of this past discrimi-
nation as a justification for heaping on additional economic disadvantages.
411 U.S. at 689 n.22.
48. Despite the supposed death of substantive due process, the Court has not hesi-
1975]
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The law involved in Kahn is a typical example of so-called "protective"
legislation.
These laws may be classified into three types:
1. those which restrict the employment of women (restrictive legisla-
tion)
2. those which prohibit the employment of women (prohibiting legisla-
tion)
3. those which provide additional benefits to women (conferring legisla-
tion).49
Obviously the statute involved in Kahn is a subcategory of conferring legis-
lation. It confers a benefit on one particular class of women-widows.
For many years legislation in all three categories was thought to
be in the best interests of women, and therefore was thought to be both
acceptable and necessary. 50 However, more recently it has been argued
that such legislation actually burdens women instead of helping them.51
The possible ill effects of restrictive or prohibitive legislation are self-evi-
dent. Yet even conferring legislation can produce problems for the recipi-
ents of its benefits.
Even laws providing benefits such as minimum wage and a required rest
period have operated to discriminate against . . . women .... Women
are sometimes discriminated against when, for example, they are put on a
schedule which includes the required rest periods, while men are not; this
tated to examine legislative purposes in the past. See, e.g., United States Dep't of
Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438
(1972).
49. Kennedy, Sex Discrimination: State Protective Laws Since Title VII, 47 NO-
TRE DAME LAW. 514, 515 (1972).
50. See Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961); Goesart v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464
(1948); Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1874); Bradwell v. Illinois,
83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872).
51. For commentaries on the adverse impact of protective legislation see Dorsen
& Ross, The Necessity of a Constitutional Amendment, 6 HAxv. CIv. Rirrs-CIv.
LIB. L. REV. 216, 222-23 (1971); Brown, Emerson, Falk, & Freedman, The Equal
Rights Amendment: A Constitutional Basis for Equal Rights for Women, 80 YALE
L.J. 871, 923 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Brown]; Durant, The Validity of State
Protective Legislation for Women in Light of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 6 SUFFOLK L. REV. 33, 34 (1971); Seidenberg, The Submissive Majority: Mod-
ern Trends in the Law Concerning Women's Rights, 55 CORNELL L. REV. 262, 265-
66 (1970); 29 C.F.R. § 1604 et seq. (1974) (Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission's guidelines on discrimination because of sex). See also Healy v. Edwards,
363 F. Supp. 1110 (E.D. La. 1973), prob. juris. noted, 415 U.S. 911 (1974) (exemp-
tion of women from jury service held unconstitutional); Ridinger v. General Motors
Corp., 325 F. Supp. 1089 (S.D. Ohio 1971) (hour and weight restrictions on women
employees declared invalid); Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Grabiec, 317 F. Supp. 1304
(S.D. II1. 1970) (hour and weight restrictions on women invalid); Sail'er Inn, Inc.
v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1, 485 P.2d 529, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1971) (invalidating state
statute prohibiting certain women from tending bar); Paterson Tavern & Grill Own-
ers Ass'n v. Borough of Hawthorne, 57 N.J. 180, 270 A.2d 628 (1970) (municipal
restrictions against women bartenders held invalid).
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arrangement is then used to justify paying women less and limiting them to
certain jobs.52
Even if the sole harm of such statutes is the perpetuation of the sexual
stereotypes upon which they are based, this in itself can have serious ef-
fects. Not only does the perpetuation of such sexual stereotypes provide
employers with a handy tool for rationalizing their hiring and compensa-
tion policies, but the psychological effects on women themselves can be
significant. 58 Women are discouraged from breaking out of the pattern
set for them. "A weak sense of self is consistent with the woman's percep-
tion that the culture devalues her."' 54 Even the woman who does break
the pattern may not be secure.
Women's image as passive, non-competitive, and intellectually inferior is so
pervasive that competitive excellence is likely to contradict even the
woman's internal definition of femininity. Superior performance may sig-
nify to the competing woman that she is not truly "female." 55
It is in just this crucial area, the true effect of protective legislation, that
the Court in Kahn once again fails to produce any meaningful analysis. 0
Although it examines the statutory objectives in the sense of overall ap-
proval or disapproval, the Court eschews any real analysis of whether this
statute harms women more than it helps them, or even harms at all those
it purports to help.57 Perhaps this lack of analysis is explained by the
fact that, although theoretically advanced by appellant,58 no concrete ex-
ample was offered to show how this statute could possibly harm women. 59
Possibly, since appellant was a male seeking the benefits of this legislation,
52. Brown, supra note 51, at 927.
53. See Note, "A Little Dearer Than His Horse": Legal Stereotypes and the
Feminine Personality, 6 HARv. Crv. RIGHTs-Cry. LIB. L. REv. 260, 273-83 (1971).
54. Id. at 274.
55. Id. at 279.
56. See Note, 88 H~Av. L. REv. 129, 138 (1974).
57. One may in theory question whether a court should examine the "true effects"
of legislation once the purpose has been found constitutionally acceptable. Yet, in
reality, courts must examine such effects to guard against "sham statutes" which have
the purported purpose of benefiting a group while actually harming them. Thus in
order for a court to truly examine the purpose of a statute it must also examine the
real world effects of that statute. --Cf. Wiesenfeld v. Secretary of HEW, 367 F. Supp.
981 (D.N.J. 1973), aft'd sub nom. Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 95 S. Ct. 1225 (1975).
58. Brief for Appellants at 12-13.
59. See Note, 88 HARV. L. REV. 129, 138 & n.58 where it is suggested that even
though this Florida statute by itself might be of minimal influence, the accumulation
of such statutes could strengthen the desire of a husband to work while his wife stays
at home.
More importantly, however, is the perpetuation of the stereotype inferiority mental-
ity which gives incentives to and justifications for employers to pay women less. It
is such a mentality that really inhibits women from making even more significant
advances on the equal work and pay front.
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such examples would be inappropriate if raised by him. Indeed, the fact
that appellant seeks the benefits of this exemption obviously clouds the
issue of possible harmful effects. Apparently, to the Court's way of think-
ing, if appellant desires to be included within the purview of this statute,
then those already within that purview must be benefiting.
Perhaps the Court is correct in these assumptions."0 The lack of analy-
sis concerning the benefits of this legislation, coupled with the lack of
analysis concerning the employment statistics, is perhaps indicative of the
Court's unwillingness to remove such benefits by eradicating such legisla-
tion. Yet the Court need not have feared such a result. There is abun-
dant argument and precedent for extension of such beneficial legislation,
as opposed to its eradication.61 If these benefits were extended to widow-
ers, then not only would the discriminatory feature of this statute disap-
pear, but any possible adverse effects would also disappear. The sexual
stereotype would no longer be perpetuated and the psychological effects
therefrom could be expected to decrease. Yet the Court totally ignores
the alternative of extension.6 2
The failure of the Court to attempt a critical evaluation of the true ef-
fects of this statute has further significance. It indicates not only that the
Court is very willing to uphold remedial legislation, but that the important
threshold determination of whether a statute is indeed remedial in nature
will receive only a cursory examination by the Court. As long as a classi-
fication is not involved which requires strict scrutiny,63 little justification
60. Widows certainly do benefit from this statute, but the issue ignored by the
Court is the weighing and balancing of benefits received against the harms inflicted.
61. See, e.g., United States Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S., 528 (1973)(federal food stamps); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (dependents'
benefits for armed services personnel); Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973) (child
support under state law); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972)(workmen's compensation and illegitimates); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365(1971) (state public assistance). But see Homemakers, Inc. v. Division of Indus.
Welfare, 356 F. Supp. 1111 (N.D. Cal. 1973) (maximum hours and overtime pay
for women); Burns v. Rohr Corp., 346 F. Supp. 994 (S.D. Cal. 1972) (rest breaks
for women). See also Note, Employment Practices and Sex Discrimination: Judicial
Extension of Beneficial Female Protective Labor Laws, 59 CORNELL L. REV. 133
(1973).
62. The conclusion to be drawn is that extension of laws only comes into consid-
eration after a statute has been found unconstitutional. The fact that an alternative
to eradication of the statute exists will not influence the Court in its initial determina-
tion of constitutionality. However, the Court should similarly not let the prospect
of eradication inhibit its examination of the true effects of a statute.
63. Even where suspect classifications have been involved, affirmative action pro-
grams have never been ruled unconstitutional per se. Courts often impose such pro-
grams themselves. See, e.g., Southern Ill. Builders Ass'n v. Ogilvie, 471 F.2d 680 (7th
Cir. 1972); United States v. Iron Workers Local 86, 443 F.2d 544 (9th Cir. 1971),
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will be required for the approval of such legislation. 64 The Court will not
be very demanding even though such legislation merely attempts to ameli-
orate the effects of an inequitable situation without in any way attacking
the root causes of that inequity.6 Yet such deference will only apply
where the purpose served66 is approved by the Court, and is actually fur-
thered by the means chosen.
CONCLUSIONS
The legitimate conclusions to be drawn from Kahn are, in reality, few
in number and speculative in nature. The safest and most straight-for-
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 984 (1971); Contractors Ass'n of E. Pa. v. Hodgson, 442 F.2d
159 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854 (1971); United States v. Electrical
Workers Local 38, 428 F.2d 144 (6th Cir. 1970).
64. The difference in the justification required can be seen by comparing Justice
Douglas' opinion in Kahn with his opinion in DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312,
320 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting). In DeFunis Justice Douglas continually empha-
sized that the University of Washington Law School should treat all applicants "in
a racially neutral manner." Id. at 337. No such consideration of neutral treatment
came into play in Kahn.
Justice Stewart hinted at the Court's mentality in an informal discussion with Har-
vard students in March, 1973. Justice Stewart wondered why women would want the
passage of the Equal Rights Amendment. Today "'the female of the species has the
best of both worlds. She can attack laws that unreasonably discriminate against her
while preserving those that favor her.'" Ginsberg, The Need for the Equal Rights
Amendment, 60 WOMEN LAW. J. 4 (1974).
65. Such mere treatment of effects is very carefully guarded against in racial dis-
crimination cases. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971); Carter
v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972). Al-
though the line is not always easily drawn between permissible and impermissible af-
firmative action programs, if such distinctions were not drawn the result would be
obvious. Either past discrimination would never be remedied or else affirmative ac-
tion programs would be reduced to the absurd.
Obviously, it is only a question of time before everyone will declare an eth-
nic identity in order to get priorities. Within a very short period, the only
group without priorities will be the WASPS, who by then should be suffici-
ently legally disadvantaged to qualify as members of a legally disadvantaged
minority group, so they too, will be finally declared a disadvantaged minor-
ity.
Flaherty & Sheard, DeFunis, The Equal Protection Dilemma: Affirmative Action
and Quotas, 12 DUQUESNE L. REv. 745, 786 (1974). But see Ely, The Constitution-
ality of Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U. Cm. L. REv. 723 (1974).
When the group that controls the decision making process classifies so as
to advantage a minority and disadvantage itself, the reasons for being usu-
sually suspicious, and, consequently, employing a stringent brand of review,
are lacking.
Id. at 735.
66. Apparently the one interest which can be most easily rejected as being accept-
.able is administrative convenience, although in the end many of the remedial statutes
may be reduced to the level of administrative convenience; see note 37 supra.
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ward conclusion is that sex will not be declared a suspect classification by
the United States Supreme Court. However, this does not indicate that
all claims of sex discrimination are to be relegated to the old equal protec-
tion minimal rationality standard of review. The implication is that the
Court will treat remedial legislation with deference. More importantly,
the threshold requirement that the interests served truly be remedial in
nature can apparently be rather easily met. When faced with programs
which are not remedial in nature, or which clearly harm women while
claiming to help them, the Court may very well strike down challenged
statutes, although probably on grounds other than equal protection. 7
Justice Douglas himself perhaps best personifies this "split-personality"
profile of the Court. In the recent case of Geduldig v. Aiello6" Justice
Douglas, in dissent, returned to his Frontiero view that sex is indeed a
suspect classification. 69 While for the rest of the Court the difference be-
tween a non-remedial and remedial program is not so drastic as to make
sex a suspect classification in the former while not in the latter, nonetheless
there can be little doubt that the Court as a whole views non-remedial
legislation with a much sterner eye.70 Without Supreme Court guidance
67. It appears that the Court is studiously trying to avoid equal protection clause
decisions, especially in the area of sex discrimination. As often as possible the Court
is turning to procedural due process analysis. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur,
414 U.S. 632 (1974); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972). See also GuNTHER
& DOWLING, ,supra note 16, at 268.
68. 94 S. Ct. 2485 (1974). In Geduldig the Court upheld the California em-
ployee funded disability program which did not include normal pregnancies in its
coverage. However, the Court side-stepped the issue of permissible versus impermis-
sible classifications based on sex by specifically finding that the California program
did not contain any sex based classifications.
While it is true that only women can become pregnant, it does not follow
that every legislative classification concerning pregnancy is a sex-based clas-
sification like those considered in Reed . . . and Frontiero . . . . Normal
pregnancy is an objectively identifiable physical condition with unique char-
acteristics.
Id. at 2492 n.20. For a fuller discussion of pregnancy benefits see Comment, Current
Trends in Pregnancy Benefits-1972 EEOC Guidelines Interpreted, 24 DEPAUL L.
REV. 127 (1974).
69. 94 S. Ct. at 2492 (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by Douglas, J.).
70. An indication of the Court's willingness to accept programs especially bene-
fiting women is the recent decision of Schlesinger v. Ballard, 95 S. Ct. 572 (1975).
The Court upheld the Navy's mandatory discharge policy for male line officers twice
passed over for promotion, but allowing female line officers to serve 13 years regard-
less of promotion. Interestingly enough, once again the existence of such a policy
could be a significant factor in preventing deserved female promotions since their
jobs are "guaranteed" by statute. Note also that Justice Douglas dissented in Ballard,
though the distinction between this case and Kahn is not at all clear. Although Bal-
lard was brought and decided under the fifth amendment due process clause, it is
still indicative of the Court's attitude toward protective legislation.
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in this area the eradication or extension of such legislation is bound to be
haphazard, at best. 71  Apparently if such protective legislation is to be
consistently dealt with it will be necessary for state courts to declare sex
a suspect classification 72 or for state legislatures to pass the Equal Rights
Amendment. 73
In addition to the Court's analysis in relation to remedial legislation,
Kahn is an apparent continuation of that line of cases beginning with Reed
and Frontiero which, while claiming to use minimal rationality, appear to
examine both the ends and means of a questioned statute. Such a middle-
tier analysis requires a legitimate, articulated state interest which is in fact
demonstrably met by the means chosen-the "demonstrable basis" stand-
ard. Although this generalization of a standard analysis to be used in all
sex discrimination-equal protection cases is the most tenuous of all the con-
clusions drawn, there is nothing as yet to indicate that the proposed
mode 7 4 is invalid. Whether the Court will provide more decisions with
which to test this middle-tier standard remains to be seen. 75
Robert P. Casey
71. Compare Murphy v. Murphy, 232 Ga. 352, 206 S.E.2d 458 (1974) (Ga. stat-
ute allowing alimony for wives only violates equal protection and due process) with
Husband M. v. Wife M., 321 A.2d 115 (Del. 1974) (upheld statute authorizing di-
vorce courts to award a wife, but not a husband, a reasonable share of spouse's prop-
erty).
72. At least three states have declared sex a suspect classification. See People
v. Ellis, 57 Ill. 2d 127, 311 N.E.2d 98 (1974); Hanson v. Hutt, 83 Wash. 2d 195,
517 P.2d 599 (1973); Sail'er Inn v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1, 485 P.2d 529, 95 Cal. Rptr.
329 (1971). Of course, even the application of strict scrutiny will not overcome pro-
tective legislation which meets a compelling state interest. Even TITLE VH allows
discrimination if the reason for the discrimination constitutes a bona fide occupa-
tional qualification [bfoq]. TITLE VII § 703(e), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e). However,
the scope of the bfoq exception has been fairly narrowly construed to date. See Old-
ham, Questions of Exclusion and Exception Under Title VIl-"Sex Plus" and the
BFOQ, 23 HASTINGS L.J. 55 (1971).
73. The effect of the Equal Rights Amendment on such legislation is not entirely
clear, however, the particular statute involved in Kahn would appear to be invalid.
So long as the law deals only with a characteristic found in all (or some)
women but no men, or in all (or some) men but no women, it does not
ignore individual characteristics found in both sexes in favor of an average
based on one sex.
Brown, supra note 51, at 893. Clearly the Kahn statute does not meet this standard.
However, programs such as the one involved in Geduldig could still very well meet
this standard and therefore be valid under the Equal Rights Amendment.
74. For a full illustration of how the demonstrable basis standard applies to all
equal protection clause cases (in addition to sex discrimination claims) see Nowak,
supra note 23, at 1093-97.
75. Healy v. Edwards, 363 F. Supp. 1110 (E.D. La. 1973), prob. juris. noted, 415
U.S. 911 (1974) (invalidating a La. statute which exempted women from jury serv-
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ices unless they file a written declaration of their desire to serve) is now awaiting
decision by the Supreme Court, see 43 U.S.L.W. 3262 (U.S. Nov. 5, 1974). 'For a
summary of oral argument in Healy see 43 U.S.L.W. 3221 (U.S. Oct. 22, 1974).
However, in the companion case of Taylor v. Louisiana, 95 S. Ct. 692 (1975) the
Court has decided that the statute at issue in Healy is indeed unconstitutional. The
Court based its decision on a finding that such a jury system deprives a criminal
defendant of his right to an impartial jury as guaranteed by the sixth and fourteenth
amendments. Thus, the Court did not reach the issue of sex discrimination. The
disposition of Healy, in light of the decision in Taylor, is not likely to reach this
issue either.
Wiesenfeld v. Secretary of HEW, 367 F. Supp. 981 (D.N.J. 1973), aff'd sub nom.
Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 95 S. Ct. 1225 (1975) (extending certain social security
benefits to widowers) was thought to be the needed test case. The lower court in
Wiesenfeld squarely faced the issue of what standard of review to apply to claims of
sex discrimination, and rejected the concept of any middle-tier standard. The court
chose to view sex as a suspect classification and thus subjected the statute to the strict
scrutiny standard of review. For a summary of the anticipated significance of a
Supreme Court decision in Wiesenfeld see PREVIEW OF UNITED STATES SUPREME
COURT CASES, Jan. 28, 1975 (No. 24).
In the weeks since the original writing of this Note the Court has affirmed the
Wiesenjeld decision in Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 95 S. Ct. 1225 (1975) and studi-
ously avoided the mention of any standard of review in its decision. It should be
noted that the Weinberger decision would not appear to affect this note's analysis
of the Court's attitude toward benign legislation. The Court rejected the govern-
ment's claim that the statute was motivated to protect widows unable to obtain a
job in the labor market, and found that its purpose was to afford a single parent
with children the option to stay at home or work. Thus the statute was not exam-
ined from the point of view being protective legislation and the differentiation based
on sex was found irrelevant.
